THE TERM STRUCTURE of interest rates has been extensively studied by economists. It is of interest to financial economists because of its close connection with the pricing of bonds of different maturities. More important, understanding the term structure of interest rates is also critical to the evaluation of the effects of alternative macroeconomic policies. For example, it is widely believed that the monetary authority can most directly control short-term interest rates, but that aggregate demand depends primarily on long-term interest rates. ' If this conviction is correct, the monetary transmission mechanism relies on the behavior of the term structure of interest rates.
the pressure of large federal deficits. It is sometimes even suggested that because of such expectational effects, prospective federal deficits are exerting a dampening effect on the current level of economic activity. These arguments presume that long rates reflect market expectations of future short rates. In this paper, we examine this view of the yield curve.
Most work on the term structure is based on some variant of the expectations hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that the long-term interest rate is a weighted average of present and expected future short-term interest rates. An approximately equivalent form of the hypothesis holds that the expected one-period holding returns on bonds of all maturities are the same or differ by constant risk premiums.3 Unfortunately, many investigators using various techniques and data sets reject the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and the expectations theory of the term structure. 4 This failure of interest rates to move as the theory predicts is not a new phenomenon. In 1938 Frederick R. Macaulay wrote, "To preserve the theoretical relationship between present long term and future short term interest rates, the 'yields' of bonds of the highest grades shouldfall during a period in which short term rates are higher than the yields of the bonds and rise during a period in which short term rates are lower. Now experience is more nearly the opposite.'"5 As we show below, the test of the expectations theory derived under the assumption of rational expectations is exactly the test Macaulay suggested almost fifty years ago. Moreover, the behavior of long rates in the recent period that we examine is also "nearly the opposite" from that implied by the theory.
While statistical rejections of the expectations theory are ubiquitous, previous research has not made clear the substantive significance of the failure of the theory. One problem with interpreting previous test results is the absence of an economically meaningful alternative hypothesis. In this paper, we embed the expectations theory of the term structure within two wider classes of hypotheses. This permits us tojudge whether the empirical deviation from the expectations hypothesis is substantively important.
The first class of hypotheses includes a quantitative expression of the notion that the long rate responds "too much" to the contemporaneous short rate. This excess-sensitivity hypothesis is suggested by work on the volatility of long-term interest rates. Since the long rate is, under the expectations hypothesis, a weighted average of expected future short rates, the long rate should vary less than the short rate. Robert Shiller examines this smoothing property of the expectations hypothesis and finds that long rates are too volatile to be consistent with the theory.6 The excess-sensitivity hypothesis we examine here is one possible explanation for this excess volatility.
The excess-sensitivity hypothesis is also suggested by evidence that the response of interest rates to money supply announcements is similar at all maturities, even though standard theories suggest that the response of long rates should be much more attenuated. Moreover, this view appears to be widely held among participants in the bond market, where it is conventional wisdom that "long rates follow short rates." This hypothesis is also implicit in the popular claim that financial markets "overreact" to news or are in some sense "myopic."
Whether long rates are excessively sensitive to short rates has important implications for macroeconomic policy. Excess sensitivity, for example, would increase the potency of monetary policy. A reduction in short rates would have a greater impact on long rates than under the expectations hypothesis. Such an expansionary action by the Federal Reserve would therefore have a greater impact on aggregate demand.
To our surprise, the results of our tests decisively reject the notion that long rates are overly sensitive to current short rates. The results, taken literally, imply that current interest rates have a much lower (sometimes negative) weight than theory would suggest so that expected future short rates exert a disproportionate influence on long-term rates.
Shiller, "Volatility."
This literal interpretation of the results, however, does not seem satisfactory. Alternatively, the results may reflect the failure of the assumption that market forecasts of future interest rates represent rational expectations. In particular, the estimates may indicate that market participants place too little weight on the current short rate in forecasting future rates. These conclusions appear robust, with similar results obtained from analyses of yields on short-term and long-term bonds and three-month and six-month Treasury bills.
Having found that the excess-sensitivity hypothesis cannot explain the term structure, we examine whether the hypothesis of a variable liquidity premium can illuminate the failure of the expectations theory. The results suggest that, at least at the short end of the term structure, the expectations theory is not very useful in explaining the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates. In particular, only one fourth of the variation in the spread between six-month and three-month Treasury bill yields is attributable to expected movements in short rates. The remainder is attributable to movements in what are tautologically labeled liquidity premiums. Large and highly variable liquidity premiums, especially within the very short end of the maturity spectrum, are not easy to understand.
Excess Sensitivity
To consider the hypothesis that long rates overreact to short rates, we examine first the behavior of twenty-year bonds and three-month bills and then the behavior of six-month and three-month bills.
LONG RATES AND SHORT RATES
Let rt be the one-period yield and Rt be the yield on a consol, an infinitely lived bond paying a fixed coupon each period. We consider the following general equation relating long rates to rationally expected short rates: conditional on information available at time t. The term 0 is the risk or liquidity premium. For now, we assume 0 is constant; later in the paper, we consider the possibility that the risk premium changes through time. The expectations theory of the term structure imposes restrictions on y which can be approximated by y = 1/(1 + R*), whereR* is the average interest rate. For values of y lower than this, greater weight is given to the contemporaneous short rate than is consistent with the expectations theory. The alternative hypothesis of excess sensitivity can arise if agents place too little weight on rationally expected future short ratesthat is, too small a y.
Equation 1 Depending on the value of y, equation 4 can represent either the standard expectations theory of the term structure or the possibility of excess sensitivity of long rates to current short rates. Under the expectations hypothesis, the coefficient on (Rt -rt) is R*, that is, roughly 0.02.7 If excess sensitivity of long rates to short rates explains the failure of the expectations hypothesis, the estimated coefficient should exceed R*, implying an estimate of y below 1/(1 + R*).
The logic of equation 4 is fairly intuitive. Ignoring the risk premium, equation 1 states that the long rate is a weighted average of short rates, with more recent short rates given greater weight than more distant ones. If Rt is greater than rt, then the short rate must be rising. The next period's long rate, Rt,1, must be higher than the current period's because it gives greater weight to the higher future short rates. Thus, according to both the expectations theory and the excess-sensitivity hypothesis, when the current long rate exceeds the current short rate, the long rate will (on average) rise.
We The first term in this expression is the coupon yield, while the second term is the capital gain or loss attributable to changes in the long rate. If we regress this holding return, less the short rate, on available information, we learn whether there are exploitable profit opportunities. Rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient in equation 4 is R* is equivalent to finding statistically significant profit opportunities.
If markets were myopic, placing greater weight on today's short rate than the expectations theory predicts, then when the short rate is high relative to the long rate, the long rate would nonetheless be "too" high and the price of a long bond "too" low. Holding long-term bonds would be a profitable strategy. This would imply that, when regressing the 7. With quarterly data, the appropriate R* for the theory is the mean quarterly interest rate, which with our sample is 0.019. The regressions in the paper use interest rates as percentage points at annual rates; but this choice affects the constant terms and not the slope coefficients. excess holding return on the spread, we would obtain a negative coefficient. Finding a negative coefficient in this regression is precisely equivalent to estimating a coefficient in equation 4 greater than R*.
Equation 4 The coefficient on the spread (R, -r,) has the wrong sign for the expectations theory. Regression 1-1 is the ordinary least squares estimate using the entire sample. The null hypothesis that the slope coefficient is 0.02 is rejected at the 5 percent level using a one-tailed test. Since the coefficient is negative, the hypothesis that it is larger than 0.02 is also rejected. Thus, we reject both the standard expectations theory of the term structure and the hypothesis of excess sensitivity of long rates to current short rates.
In October indicates substantial heteroskedasticity coinciding with this change in monetary regime. After the change in October 1979, the residual variance is much greater.
In regressions 1-2 and 1-3 we split the sample to examine whether the change in policy rule affected the relation between long rates and short rates. The estimates suggest there has been no shift in this relation; the coefficient has the incorrect sign in both subsamples. The hypothesis that it is 0.02 is rejected for the earlier period. It is not rejected for the latter period, because there are many fewer observations and much greater residual variance. The residuals from the split samples appear Gaussian. In particular, an examination of the third and fourth moments indicates no skewness nor unusual kurtosis that might lead one to distrust the reported standard errors. The rejection of the theory for the first subsample appears statistically sound. Moreover, the point estimate for the second subsample indicates that the theory has worked no better Regression 1-4 uses the entire sample but weights the two subsamples to correct for the heteroskedasticity. The weight is the reciprocal of the root-mean-squared residual from equation 1. Again, the coefficient is negative, and the null hypothesis that it is 0.02 or larger is rejected at the 5 percent level. The data support neither the expectations hypothesis nor the excess-sensitivity hypothesis.
These empirical results cannot be interpreted within the context of equation 1; equation 1 is valid only if -y is between zero and one. The coefficient estimates taken literally, however, imply that y is greater than one. Nonetheless, we are left with the conclusion that myopia explains neither the excess volatility of long-term interest rates nor the other statistical evidence against the expectations theory.
While our results imply that an investor could, on average, make money by taking advantage of the failure of the expectations theory, the risks involved are very large. For example, with long and short rates at about 13 percent and 10 percent respectively, the profitable strategy suggested by regression 1-4 is to go short in three-month Treasury bills and to use the proceeds to buy twenty-year bonds. The estimates indicate that a $1,000 investment of this sort would yield an expected profit of $12 in three months, less any transactions costs.'1 Such an investment, however, is very risky. At the level of uncertainty observed since 1979, the standard deviation of this $12 profit is $165. The probability that this strategy would actually produce a loss exceeds 45 percent. Thus, the failure of the expectations theory does not imply the presence of relatively riskless profit opportunities.
Potential problems with sample selection and data mining always make the evaluation of statistical results difficult. For example, one might argue that our results are attributable to an unusual sequence of inflation surprises over our sample period. A standard practice is to check the validity of the conclusion on an independent data set. One can view our regressions as just such a validity check. As noted, Macaulay was aware that long rates do not move as the theory predicts. Moreover, he made his observation many years before the beginning of our data set. Furthermore, Shiller reports estimates of a regression equation parallel to equation 4 for six different data sets covering a variety of different sample periods and interest rates. 12 In five of the six cases, the estimated slope coefficient is negative, and in the sixth it is close to zero. In all cases, his results are consistent with our finding that the failure of the expectations theory cannot be related to excess sensitivity of the long rate. The results in table 1 are not merely an artifact of recent experience but appear to be an empirical regularity.
SHORT RATES AND SHORTER RATES
There are a number of potential objections to testing the expectations hypothesis using long-term rates. The linear approximation on which the derivation depends may be an unsatisfactory approximation for such long-term yields. It is also possible that there is significant segmentation between the short-term and long-term bonds markets, as investors may have distinct "preferred habitats." In such a situation, expectations could be rational at the same time that the expectations theory of the term structure would not hold. We can address both of these objections by examining yields only at the short end of the term structure. Moreover, the use of short-term instruments obviates the need to model expectations over a long horizon, making possible the examination of a broader range of issues. This section therefore develops tests of term structure hypotheses similar to those in the preceding section but applied to three-month and six-month Treasury bills.
Let rt be the one-period yield and r(6) be the two-period yield. We consider this class of hypotheses:
(5) r 6)= 0 + Art + (1-X)Etrt+1.
For pure discount bonds, the expectations hypothesis posits that A = ?/2. In this case, the yield from holding a two-period bond equals the expected yield from holding two one-period bonds in sequence plus a constant risk premium. Under the alternative hypothesis that the longer rate, r(6), is excessively sensitive to the short rate, r, the current short rate receives greater weight than under the expectations theory. That is, the excess-sensitivity hypothesis implies A > ?/2.
12. Shiller, "Volatility." The data sets Shiller uses extend back to 1919 for the United States and to 1824 for the United Kingdom. All his data sets end before 1978. As we point out above, recent data appear to confirm the historical pattern.
We can explicitly derive the excess-sensitivity model for one-and two-period bills under the assumption that expectations are partly myopic. Let us suppose that the expectations theory of the term structure holds but with expectations that are not necessarily rational. That is, Equation 10 is also intuitive. Ignoring the risk premium, equation 5 implies that the two-period rate is a weighted average of the two consecutive one-period rates. Therefore, when the current longer rate is above the current short rate, the current longer rate should be below next period's short rate. A regression of (r,+ I -rt ) on (r(6) -rt) should yield a positive coefficient.
We can write equation 10 in two other equivalent ways. First, by adding (ri6) -rt) to both sides of the equation, we obtain a regression of (rt -rt) on (r,6) -rt). This new equation relates the change in short rates to the spread. Second, by subtracting (r,6) -r,) from both sides of equation 10, we obtain a regression of [rt -(2r,6) -rt+ 1)] on (ri6) -rt).
Under the null hypothesis that A = 1/2, the coefficient in this regression is zero. This second equivalent form has a natural interpretation. Since (2r(6) -r,+ 1) is the one-period holding return on a two-period instrument, the variable on the left-hand side is the difference in holding return between short and longer instruments. Under the expectations theory, this excess return cannot be forecasted. The failure to find a zero coefficient in this regression or (equivalently) a coefficient of one in equation 10 indicates the existence of expected profit opportunities. If markets were myopic, then when the short rate is high relative to the longer rate, the longer rate would nonetheless be "too" high, and the price of a longer instrument would be "too" low. Longer instruments would thus be profitable when the short rate is relatively high. A regression of excess return [rt -(2rt -r,+ 1)] on the spread (r (6) -rt) would yield a positive coefficient. Finding a positive coefficient in this regression is exactly equivalent to estimating A > /2 in equation 10. Table 2 shows estimates of equation 10 with U.S. quarterly data from 1963:1 to 1983:4. The yield at the first week of the quarter on six-month Treasury bills is rt,6 and the yield on three-month bills is r,.
The coefficient on the spread has the wrong sign. Regression 2-1 is the ordinary least squares estimate for the entire sample. The null hypothesis that the coefficient is one is rejected at the 1 percent level. The parameter estimates, taken literally, imply insufficient rather than excessive sensitivity of longer-term interest rates to short yields.
The residuals in regression 2-1, like those of regression 1-1, indicate substantial heteroskedasticity associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedure in 1979. Regressions 2-2 and 2-3 split the sample, and in both subsamples the sign of the coefficient is incorrect. Just as for the regressions based on equation 4, the recent subsample has too few observations to reject the expectations hypothesis. Yet the theory is rejected for the earlier subsample, and the point estimates do not indicate any structural change caused by the change in monetary policy regime. An examination of the residuals from regression 2-2 indicates no skewness nor unusual kurtosis, suggesting they are at least roughly Gaussian. Again, the rejection of the expectations theory and the excess-sensitivity hypothesis appears statistically sound. 13 Regression 2-4 again uses the entire sample but weights the two subsamples by the reciprocal of the root-mean-squared residual from regression 2-1 to correct for heteroskedasticity. Again, the null hypothesis that the coefficient is one or larger is rejected at the 1 percent level. Again, the estimate implies X < 0, which taken literally implies that the current short rate has a negative weight in forming longer-term yields. This finding is clearly implausible, but it does indicate that the data are 13. These results raise the question of whether the results in the preceding subsection are due only to the failure of the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the term structure. This possibility was tested by replicating the previous tests with oneyear and twenty-year bonds. Very similar results were obtained. consistent neither with the expectations hypothesis nor with the excesssensitivity hypothesis. 14 As already noted, the excess-sensitivity model for one-and twoperiod bills is equivalent to a model in which expectations are partly myopic. The estimate in regression 2-4 implies A is -0.89 and w is -2.8. Thus, in the myopic expectations interpretation of the model, the market expectation gives a negative weight to the current short rate and an excessively large weight to the rational expectation. This interpretation of the results is again implausible. It does indicate, however, that the failure of the expectations theory cannot be easily explained by an appeal to naive expectation formation.
Observers of financial markets often comment that these markets are myopic. The empirical results in both subsections decisively reject a simple quantitative expression of this view. The implausibility of the results suggests that equations 1 and 8 are not satisfactory models of the term structure. Taken at face value, the results imply that the market is hyperopic: the market gives too little weight to the current rate and too much weight to the expected future rate or its determinants.
A parallel phenomenon has been observed in the stock market. Shiller finds that when current dividends are high relative to the current price, the holding return on the stock market is high."5 Using an argument similar to that used with regard to equation 1, this suggests that the market gives too little weight to contemporaneous dividends. Similarly, Sanjoy Basu shows with cross-sectional data that when a company's current earnings are high relative to its price, the company's stock will on average outperform the market. 16 give too little weight to contemporaneous earnings. Thus none of these violations of the efficient-markets hypothesis is consistent with the alternative hypothesis of myopia.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF OVERREACTION
As explained above, the excess-sensitivity hypothesis that we have examined and rejected is equivalent to a model in which investors irrationally place too large a weight on the current short rate in forecasting future short rates. Although this formulation appears to be a natural model of "irrational" expectations, it is not the only possible one. We next consider another plausible model of overreaction in which, instead of placing too large a weight on the level of the current short rate, investors place too large a weight on the news contained in the current short rate.
Let us again suppose that the expectations theory holds: In this formulation, the long rate ri6) differs from an average of the current and future short rates by the term Ot. Our test above assumes Ot is constant. In this section we make the less-restrictive assumption that Ot is uncorrelated with short rates.
The term The variance of the spread between longer and short rates is thus decomposed into the variance in expected changes in short rates and Var(O,). This decomposition implies that expected changes in the short rate account for only 26 percent of the variance in the spread between the six-month and three-month Treasury bills. We can reject the null hypothesis that Var(O,) = 0, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that expected changes in the short rate account for none of the variance in the spread between three-month and six-month bills.
It is important to note that, although this unexplained liquidity premium Ot appears central to the spread between six-month and threemonth rates, it is relatively unimportant to the level of six-month rates. We can decompose the variance in the six-month rate as follows: 
Conclusions
The data decisively reject, both statistically and substantively, the expectations hypothesis regarding the term structure of interest rates. The alternative hypothesis that long rates are overly sensitive to short rates is also decisively rejected. The expectations theory can be modified to include an unexplained random liquidity premium, but then expected interest rate movements account for only a small part of the variance in the spread between interest rates of different maturities. Most of the 23. The reason for this is that both short and long rates are highly autocorrelated, and thus the variance of r,6' is much greater than the variance of (r,6) -r). For example, suppose that r, followed an AR(1) process with parameter 0.8 and that the expectations hypothesis held exactly. Then we can show that Var(r,6) -r,) would be 1 percent of Var(r(6)). Introducing a random liquidity premium increases both variances equally and thus increases Var(r(6) -r,) proportionally more. changes in the slope of the yield curve reflect these changing liquidity premiums or expectations that do not satisfy the standard postulates of rationality.
These results suggest the importance of developing models capable of explaining fluctuating liquidity premiums.24 Presumably this would involve recognizing in some way the heterogeneous liquidity positions of different economic agents. The results also raise important questions about the monetary transmission mechanism. If, as usually thought, spending decisions and capital-asset valuations depend primarily on long-term rates, monetary policy may operate by changing liquidity premiums as well as by affecting short rates. Although many question the effectiveness of open market operations directed at shifting the yield curve, such as "Operation Twist," the issue is difficult to evaluate without a fuller understanding of the determinants of liquidity premiums. The failure of the expectations hypothesis does make more plausible the view that the supplies of assets of different maturities influence yields.25 However, it is difficult to understand why these effects would be important in the market for three-month and six-month bills.
Our negative results provide an additional reason for uncertainty in predicting the effects exerted on financial markets by alternative monetary and fiscal policies; the results suggest that estimating the impact of such policies on future short-term rates is not likely to be a good guide to predicting their impact on long-term rates or asset valuations. These effects may depend more on liquidity premiums than on expectations. Without a satisfactory theory of liquidity premiums, predicting the effect of policies on the shape of the yield curve is almost impossible. 
